EII Submits Testimony at Senate Committee on Rules Hearing on Ongoing Threats to Election Administration

Statement of Tiana Epps-Johnson, Executive Director of the Center for Tech and Civic Life 

United States Senate Committee on Rules

Hearing on Ongoing Threats to Election Administration

Nov. 1, 2023

As the leader of a nonprofit dedicated to making our elections more professional, inclusive, and secure, I’m grateful to share with you perspectives and stories from election administrators regarding the challenging security environment our election workers are wrestling with.

 In 2017, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officially designated election infrastructure[1] as “part of the existing Government Facilities critical infrastructure sector.” DHS noted that election infrastructure “is vital to our national interests, and cyberattacks on this country are becoming more sophisticated, and bad cyber actors – ranging from nation-states, cybercriminals and hacktivists – are becoming more sophisticated and dangerous.”

Unfortunately, in the six years since that time, federal, state and local governments have failed to adequately fund our election workers to combat threats.  It has been a challenge to unite all levels of government to ensure we have both the resources and policy environment to ensure safe, secure elections for both voters and the election workers supporting American democracy.

21st-century threats, including interference from hostile foreign countries, ransomware attacks as we’ve seen in the private sector, and physical threats targeted at election officials, require 21st-century equipment and mitigation tools. Truly secure elections require up-to-date equipment, adequate staffing levels to create appropriate redundancy and resiliency, and space that is secure against both natural disasters and bad actors.

 In 2020, the DHS Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency released the Election Infrastructure Sub Sector-Specific Plan. This strategic plan highlights the current enhanced threats to the security of our elections and recognizes the need for enhanced resources to counteract these threats.

Even today, despite many stories in the media about the range of threats election workers face, not enough attention is being paid to this problem. The threats facing election workers are very real, and that concern is being raised from bipartisan sources. Just last year the Department of Justice convened with a group of approximately 750 election workers and officials and found troubling activity. After reviewing 1,000 contacts that were considered hostile or harassing, 11 percent met the threshold for a federal criminal investigation[2].

 Those 11 percent of threats must be taken seriously, and addressed. Many states are exploring increasing penalties[3]to further deter these activities and clarifying the legal line to allow prosecutors to confidently charge bad actors. But for the 89 percent of incidents of harassment that do not reach a criminal threshold, more must be done to support elections offices to protect their staff, facilities, and the public who rely on them. While federal agencies and nonprofits like CISA have provided guidelines and best practices to enhance physical security to protect election offices, many counties do not have the budgets to support the capital improvement projects necessary to implement those recommendations[4]. That leaves counties like Denver, Colorado, whose Clerk & Recorder’s office was struck by a rogue bullet earlier this year, unable to fund the full security improvements recommended in CISA’s assessment[5]. In Syracuse, New York, the board of elections is nearly $1 million short of what they requested[6].

We know that it is impossible for law enforcement to shield local election officials from every intimidating message or dangerous individual, but better resources can make a difference in the safety and resiliency of local election offices. Baltimore, Maryland, for example, has installed floodlights in their parking lots[7] and has established a buddy system so that “nobody is ever [in the elections facility] by themselves.” But for the thousands of smaller jurisdictions that have at most one full-time dedicated employee, safety in numbers is impossible and small local budgets cannot bridge the gap.

 Last October, the FBI issued a warning about threats to election workers, and the media reported that Colorado was a top state for threats[8] to election workers. The head of Colorado’s association of clerks – a former Republican clerk –  testified before Congress[9] that threats were on the rise, saying, “‘These emerging and pervasive threats to election workers and the clerks that oversee that work are falling the heaviest on Republican clerks right now. Many, if not all of them, have seen an uptick in everything from concerning emails to actual physical threats.’”

All of this is happening while funding remains in short supply for many election departments. The Elections Infrastructure Initiative has estimated the full cost of safe, secure elections at more than $50 billion over 10 years[10]. Both the House and Senate FY ‘23 Financial Services and General Government Appropriations bills included $400 million in federal grants, but the final amount appropriated for election grants was just $75 million. For context the City of Los Angeles alone spent more than $50 million[11] to administer the Sept. 14, 2021 California recall election – meaning even $400 million amounts to just 12.5 percent of the total funding used by one city for one election.

 Funding shortfalls can lead to security vulnerabilities in a variety of ways that won’t catch headlines, but are still very real. One under-the-radar issue we’ve seen: small jurisdictions have told us that they lack the ability to access secure wireless internet, making it challenging for them to download PDFs with guidance from state officials, to say nothing of the regular software security updates their equipment requires.

Meanwhile, Reuters has reported that there are many jurisdictions throughout the country using voting equipment that is no longer manufactured[12]. This is not just a question of spare parts, but whether outdated equipment can meet modern-day best-in-class security standards. 

A failure at any point in this system — lack of training, physical security, old voting machines, outdated computers or lack of secure internet access — could lead to a chain reaction that would reduce voter confidence in our system.

Finally, I should note the challenges go beyond funding alone and that election officials are also dealing with a challenging policy environment. To cite just one example, consider that even though the Supreme Court has recently ruled that it is Constitutional to limit firearms at polling places, only 12 states and the District of Columbia have taken this common-sense step to protect poll workers and voters[13]. This lack of action is deeply troubling in our current environment of increasingly widespread disinformation. Action should be taken at all levels to ensure election workers are protected from threats at polling places and central vote count sites.

I would like to conclude with a note of optimism. I believe there is interest from leaders of all political stripes to address this challenge. Just recently I joined a panel discussion at the University of Virginia with John Bridgeland, who ran the Domestic Policy Council under George W. Bush, introduced by Melody Barnes, Director of White House Domestic Policy Council under President Barack Obama. The group was united around solutions to strengthen the machinery of democracy. 

The Pew Research Center has found that voter confidence[14] has improved since the last presidential election. There exists a future where we can build on that progress and create an election environment where voters remain confident our system is secure and where election officials can go to work secure in the knowledge that they have a safe workplace and they have the resources they need to do their work. This hearing is an important step in educating the public about the work that remains to be done to make that future a reality.

I thank you for your time and continued interest in this critical issue.

[1] “Election Security | Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency CISA,” March 11, 2023. https://www.cisa.gov/topics/election-security#:~:text=In%20January%202017%2C%20the%20Department,infrastructure%20qualifies%20as%20critical%20infrastructure.

[2] “Readout of Election Threats Task Force Briefing with Election Officials and Workers,” August 1, 2022. https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/readout-election-threats-task-force-briefing-election-officials-and-workers.

[3] “State Laws Providing Protection for Election Officials and Staff,” October 31, 2023. https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/state-laws-providing-protection-for-election-officials-and-staff.

[4] CNN. “‘Our Security Here Is a Joke’: Election Workers Lament Lack of Federal Spending on Security Ahead of Crucial Midterms,” October 27, 2022. Accessed November 1, 2023. https://www.cnn.com/2022/10/27/politics/election-security-federal-funding-violent-threats/index.html.

[5] Birkeland, Bente. “Denver’s Mayor and Clerk and Recorder Are at Odds over Election Office’s Resources Ahead of 2024.” Denverite, October 20, 2023. https://denverite.com/2023/10/20/denvers-mayor-and-clerk-and-recorder-are-at-odds-over-election-offices-resources-ahead-of-2024/.

[6] Syracuse. “Commissioner: Onondaga County Is Underfunding Our Elections (Guest Opinion by Dustin M. Czarny),” October 25, 2023. https://www.syracuse.com/opinion/2023/10/commissioner-onondaga-county-is-underfunding-our-elections-guest-opinion-by-dustin-m-czarny.html.

[7] Lee, John. “Maryland Election Officials Roll out Ballot Box Security Measures.” WYPR, June 29, 2022. https://www.wypr.org/wypr-news/2022-06-29/maryland-election-officials-roll-out-ballot-box-security-measures.

[8] Axios. “Colorado Election Conspiracies Cloud Vote as Mail Ballots Arrive,” October 17, 2022. Accessed November 1, 2023. https://www.axios.com/local/denver/2022/10/17/election-conspiracies-threat-fbi-colorado.

[9] Kim, Caitlyn, and Bente Birkeland. “Threats against Election Workers Bring Head of Colorado’s Clerks Association to Congress.” Colorado Public Radio, August 3, 2022. https://www.cpr.org/2022/08/03/colorado-election-workers-threats-congress/.

[10] Election Infrastructure Initiative. “50 States of Need — Election Infrastructure Initiative,” n.d. https://www.modernizeourelections.org/50statesofneed.

[11] Myers, John. “California Recall Election Cost $200 Million, Officials Say - Los Angeles Times.” Los Angeles Times, February 4, 2022. https://techandciviclife.us1.list-manage.com/track/click?u=6711f339c47ffcdd2f9cbbfd9&id=cf453674fb&e=fc40c10f74.

[12] Cage, Feilding. “Machine Politics: How America Casts and Counts Its Votes.” Reuters, August 23, 2022. https://www.reuters.com/graphics/USA-ELECTION/VOTING/mypmnewdlvr/.

[13] Giffords: Courage to Fight Gun Violence. “Guns and Voting: How to Protect Elections after Bruen | Giffords.” Giffords, September 29, 2023. https://giffords.org/report/guns-and-voting-how-to-protect-elections-after-bruen/.

[14] Nadeem, Reem. “Views of Election Administration and Confidence in Vote Counts | Pew Research Center.” Pew Research Center - U.S. Politics & Policy, October 31, 2022. https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2022/10/31/views-of-election-administration-and-confidence-in-vote-counts/.